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Building their paper around long-standing critics of the EU capital maintenance 
regime and the distribution rules thereof, the authors consider introducing addi-
tional instruments for creditor protection into Croatian company law, where special 
regard is paid to the ‘solvency test’. Given the scope and aim of the EU Codification 
Directive, the paper seeks to find out whether and to what extent such a test could 
be introduced into Croatian law. The paper argues that the EU regime allows the 
introduction of the solvency test into Croatian law on public limited companies as a 
distribution test complementary to the two-fold ‘balance sheet test’ leaving, however, 
entirely to the Croatian legislator to decide about the place of the solvency test in 
private limited companies. Alongside the examination of legal sources and literature, 
the authors pursue their research by employing the systematic and teleological anal-
ysis of distribution rules under the Croatian Companies’ Act. That act has already 
introduced the ‘circumstances test’ as a yardstick for the assessment of the validi-
ty of the decision to withhold dividend payment. After the introduction, the second 
part of the paper considers the concept of legal capital and provides an overview of 
potentially more efficient means of creditor protection. The third part analyses the 
Croatian legal capital regime, aiming at revisiting it in light of the solvency test. This 
part examines various solvency tests so as to decide which one could align with the 
Croatian distribution rules. The fourth part summarizes and concludes the paper.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades the concept of legal capital, established by the Sec-
ond Company Law Directive1 and maintained in the Codification,2 has re-
ceived a lot of attention in discussions about prospects of EU company law. 
The discussions followed mainly as a result of the EU Commission’s Action 
Plan to modernize EU company law,3 aiming at simplifying the regime pro-
vided under the Second Company Law Directive, or even replacing it with an 
alternative regime in the long-term.4 
Since the adoption of the plan, the legal capital rules have faced heavy crit-
icism for being inappropriate and ineffective measures for the protection of 
creditors’ interests.5 Many have urged for revisiting the EU capital mainte-
1 Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 on coordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States 
of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in respect 
of the formation of public limited liability companies and the maintenance and alteration of 
their capital, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, (OJ L 26, 31/1/1977),  pp. 1–13. 
Hereinafter referred to as the Second Company Law Directive.
2 Directive (EU) 2017/1132 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 
relating to certain aspects of company law (codification) (Text with EEA relevance), (OJ L 169, 
30/6/2017), ch. IV (Capital maintenance and alteration). Hereinafter referred to as the Codifi-
cation.
3 Hopt, K.: Comparative Company Law 2018, ECGI Working Paper No. 460/2019, July 
2019, [https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3421389], p. 18, available at [https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3421389], accessed on 04/06/2020. See Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Modernising Company Law and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward, Brus-
sels, 21.5.2003, COM/2003/0284 final/, pp. 17-18, available at [https://op.europa.eu/en/publica-
tion-detail/-/publication/11f14007-f2d6-4610-9bc4-2402324472f4/language-en]. Hereinafter 
referred to as AP 2003.
4 AP 2003, pp. 17-18; 24-26. Two documents preceded the plan. In 1999 the SLIM (‘Sim-
pler Legislation for the Internal Market’) proposal aimed at modest simplification of the EU 
legal capital rules without leaving the legal capital concept. In 2002 the High Level Group of 
Company Law Experts assesed the legal capital concept as a costly, inaccurate and inflexible 
source of equity funding, and suggested its reform in three possible directions: simplification 
along the SLIM lines, complete abandonment of the concept along the US lines, or elimination 
of the legal capital accompanied by the introduction of the solvency test. See A Modern Reg-
ulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe: A Consultative Document of the High Level 
Group of Company Law Experts (‘Winter Report’),  ch. 3, pp. 23-26, available at [https://www.
eerstekamer.nl/eu/documenteu/a_modern_regulatory_framework_for/f=/vgklizzpd9we.pdf], 
accessed 04/06/2020.
5 Critics may mainly be found in the Anglo-American literature. See, among others, Rick-
ford, J. (ed): Reforming Capital, Report of the Interdisciplinary Group on Capital Mainte-
nance, European Business Law Review (EBLR), 15(4) 2004, p. 947, available at [https://www.
19
Kristijan Poljanec, Hana Horak: Solvency test as yardstick for prudent dividend distribution: A Croatian outlook
nance regime either by complementing6 it or abandoning it in its entirety.7 The 
reformists also hinged their critics upon cases in Centros,8 Űberseering9 and 
Inspire Art,10 which came roughly around the same period of time. In those 
cases, the Court of Justice of the European Union11 referred to the minimum 
legal capital requirement as an unnecessary and potentially disproportionate 
means of creditor protection. Such a requirement may preclude unhindered 
exertion of the freedom of establishment.12 Concerning the purportedly pro-
tective character of such requirement for creditors, it was suggested that the 
EU Member States should seek to adopt measures which are less restrictive, 
or which interfere less with fundamental freedoms by, for example, making it 
biicl.org/files/916_capital_maintenance_report_-_final.pdf], accessed on 04/06/2020; Ar-
mour, J.: Legal Capital: An Outdated Concept?, European Business Organization Law Review 
(EBOR), 7(1) 2006, [https://doi.org/10.1017/s156675290600005x], p. 3, available at [https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=910826], accessed 04/06/2020; Ferran, E.: Re-
visiting Legal Capital, European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR), 20(3) 2019, 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-019-00161-z], pp. 525-526, available at [https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3449052], accessed 04/06/2020. Some continental authors 
have followed suit, among others, Rodés Saldaña, L.: Suitability of EU Legal Capital Rules as 
a Mechanism of Creditor Protection: A Comparative and Functional Study, Doctoral Thesis, 
University of Leicester Law School, Leicester, 2019, pp. 57-62.; Jakšić, T.; Petrović, S.: Mogući 
pravci izmjena i dopuna hrvatskog prava društava, Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta Sveučilišta u 
Rijeci, 37(3) 2016, pp. 1114-1115. For a comprehensive overview of possible disadvantages of 
the legal capital rules see also Jovanovič, D.: Svrha temeljnog kapitala u pravima EU,  Pravo 
u gospodarstvu: časopis za gospodarsko-pravnu teoriju i praksu, 48(2) 2009, pp. 508; 513-518.
6 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 114; Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 539-542.
7 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 921; 986;  Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 3.; Hopt, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 29.; 
Ferran, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 542; Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 114.
8 Judgment of the Court of 9 March 1999, Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, 
C-212/97, EU:C:1999:126. For detailed overview of the case see, among others, Horak, H. et 
al., European Market Law: Handbook, Vol. 1, Voronezh/Zagreb, 2014, pp. 214-225; Horak, 
H.; Dumančić, K.; Šafranko, Z.: Sloboda poslovnog nastana trgovačkih društava u pravu Eu-
ropske unije, Ekonomski fakultet Zagreb, 2013, pp. 20-22, available at [http://www.efzg.unizg.
hr/userdocsimages/PRA/2017%20-%20novi%20web/Publikacije/SLOBODA%20POSLOV-
NOG%20NASTANA.pdf], accessed 09/06/2020.
9 Judgment of the Court of 5 November 2002, Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Com-
pany Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), C-208/00, EU:C:2002:632. For detailed overview of the 
case see, among others,  Horak et al., Sloboda…, pp. 22-24; Horak et al., European…, pp. 226-
243.
10 Judgment of the Court of 30 September 2003, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor 
Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd, C-167/01, EU:C:2003:512. For detailed overview of the case see, 
among others, Horak et al., Sloboda…, pp. 24-26.
11 Hereinafter referred to as the CJEU.
12 Centros, paras. 35-37; Überseering, para. 93; Inspire Art, paras. 42; 135.
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possible in law for public creditors to obtain necessary guarantees.13 Thereby, 
as some argue, the CJEU accelerated the dilution of minimum capital require-
ments in national company laws.14 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned critics, the institutional attempts to revisit 
the EU capital maintenance regime have not yielded much result. The proposal 
for a regulation of a European Private Company (Societas Privata Europaea)15 
sought to relax the legal capital concept by introducing a minimum capital 
requirement of 1 EUR and a solvency statement. However, it failed following 
the Member States’16 and the EU Parliament’s17 dissenting opinions on a min-
imum capital requirement. Moreover, the latest ‘codification’ of EU company 
law has not revisited the traditional mandatory capital maintenance regime. 
It has remained practically intact ever since the EU introduced it in 1976.18 It 
follows that, for the time being, any discussion on introducing alternative or 
complementary means of creditor protection, including solvency test, remains 
confined to the Member States’ domain. Such state-of-the-art allows for diver-
gent legal solutions dependent on national legal traditions. 
Building their paper around critics of the EU capital maintenance regime, the 
second part presents the concept of legal capital and provides an overview of 
other purportedly more effective means of creditor protection. A broad ar-
ray of additional safeguards may encompass several contracts, property, and 
company law safeguards. The paper, however, does not pretend to delve into 
all potentially more effective means of creditor protection, as they rely on the 
inventiveness of the business practice. It rather intends to present the most de-
bated ones. Moreover, the analysis carried out will be confined to the legal per-
13 Centros,  para. 37.
14 Ferran, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 522.
15 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the statute for a European private company 
{SEC(2008) 2098} {SEC(2008) 2099} /COM/2008/0396 final - CNS 2008/0130/, available 
at [https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1591291995560&uri=CELEX-
:52008PC0396], accessed on 04/06/2020. Hereinafter referred to as the SPE Proposal.
16 [https://www.worker-participation.eu/Company-Law-and-CG/Company-Law/Europe-
an-Private-Company-SPE], accessed on 02/06/2020. 
17 The Commitee on Legal Affairs of the EU Parliament suggested that the minimum cap-
ital of 1 EUR should have been reserved only for companies that would apply the solvency 
test. Otherwise the minimum capital should have been 8,000 EUR. See more on the proposal 
in Siems, M.; Herzog, L.; Rosenhäger, E.: The European Private Company (SPE): An At-
tractive New Legal Form of Doing Business?, Butterworths Journal of International Banking 
and Financial Law, February 2009, pp. 10-11, available at [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=1350465], accessed 04/06/2020. 
18 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 23.
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spective. The accounting perspective, most notably the impact of the fair value 
accounting standard on the legal capital maintenance, shall be considered only 
to the extent necessary for a comprehensive understanding of the matter, as 
more elaborated discussion would go beyond the scope of the paper.19 
In the third part, the authors carry out an assessment of the Croatian capital 
maintenance regime in light of the foregoing considerations so as to consider 
a possibility of introducing a solvency test as a yardstick for prudent dividend 
distribution. Alongside the examination of legal sources, case law, and litera-
ture, the authors employ a systematic and teleological analysis of distribution 
rules under the Croatian Companies’ Act. The discussion on the role of the 
solvency test will be confined only to dividend payment as the most common 
type of capital distribution. However, the findings of this part could apply mu-
tatis mutandis to other types of distributions.20 
The paper seeks to find out whether and to what extent a solvency test could 
be introduced into Croatian law de lege ferenda. The authors build their 
research around earlier attempts to revisit the prescriptive minimum capital 
rules under Croatian company law, and related suggestions to replace it with 
a ‘payment test’.21 It is argued that the EU regime would allow the introduc-
tion of such a test into Croatian law on public limited companies as a dis-
tribution test complementary to the two-fold ‘balance sheet test’. However, 
it remains the national legislator’s sole discretion to decide about the place 
of the solvency test in private limited companies. As solvency tests differ, 
this part of the paper takes stock of variant forms of solvency tests to decide 
which one could best align with the Croatian rules. The fourth part summa-
rizes and concludes the paper. 
19 For a more elaborated discussion on the interaction between capital safeguards and fi-
nancial reporting standards see Horak, H.; Poljanec, K.: Fighting Short-Termism in EU Com-
pany Law after the Financial Crisis, European Company Law (EUCL), 17(4), 2020, pp. 117-
119, available at [https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Company+Law/17.4/
EUCL2020018], accessed on 03/08/2020.
20 Distributions should be understood broadly: dividends, purchase or redemption by the 
company of its own shares (share buy-backs), or alterations in company’s capital in relation to 
transfers of assets to shareholders (reduction of capital). Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 922-923. 
21 Jakšić; Petrović, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1115.
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2. CONCEPT OF LEGAL CAPITAL AND THE ALTERNATIVES 
THEREOF
2.1. THEORY OF CAPITAL MAINTENANCE
The concept of legal (share, nominal) capital belongs to the continental com-
pany law tradition.22 Broadly speaking, the continental concept is built around 
two blocks of rules.23 On the one hand, there are rules on minimum share 
capital, imposing an obligation on the shareholders to pay up some minimum 
equity into the company.24 In return, they will be vested with the limited li-
ability privilege25 and a share in the nominal capital.26 This rule is coupled 
with the theory of capital maintenance. The theory imposes an obligation on 
the company to maintain and protect a nominal amount of net assets of an 
amount equivalent to the paid-up minimum capital against distribution to the 
shareholders.27 Such capital should be considered as available for doing busi-
ness; however, it should be not distributed to the shareholders unless special 
mechanisms of creditor protection are put in place, or the company is being 
wound up.28 
By imposing such constraints, capital maintenance rules serve various func-
tions. There is a wide consensus that those rules primarily secure creditors’ 
rights.29 It is argued that legal capital rules may secure creditors against the 
risk of mindless acts by the shareholders, which may lead to the reduction 
of the company’s assets, making the company more vulnerable to insolven-
22 Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 507; Hopt, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 28.; Armour, op.cit. (n. 5), p. 2. 
23 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 22.
24 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 937.; Barbić, J.: Pravo društava. Knjiga Druga. Društva kapi-
tala. Svezak I.: Dioničko društvo, Peto, izmijenjeno i dopunjeno izdanje, Organizator, Zagreb, 
2010, p. 31.
25 Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 10.
26 Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 31.
27 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 937; Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 44; Maurović, Lj.: Directive 
2006/68/EC Amending the Second Company Law Directive EU as Regards the Maintenance 
of Public Limited Liability Companies’ Capital and the Acquisition of Own Shares, 2013, 
[https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2237882], p. 12. Available at [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=2237882], accessed on 04/06/2020. 
28 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 928.
29 Winter Report, p. 23; Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 931; Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 507; 
Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 2; Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1.; Ferran, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 528. 
However, the concept of fixed per value (accountable per value) shares assigns certain nominal 
value to every single share representing part of the share capital. Thereby, it also protects the 
shareholders against dilution of their rights. Winter Report, p. 23. 
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cy.30 The rules are supposed to protect the creditors against excessive distribu-
tions,31 and prevent the company’s insolvency.32 Moreover, legal capital rules 
could prevent the reduction of the expected value of creditors’ claims, even if 
shareholders’ demeanor will not result in insolvency.33 Therefore, legal capi-
tal rules are supposed to enable creditors to rely on the fact that the equity is 
going to be maintained as a sort of set ‘guarantee’ to meet their claims unless 
reduced in the regular course of business.34 
By adopting prescriptive legal capital rules, the EU capital maintenance regime 
has decided to follow the theory of legal capital concerning the public limited 
liability companies (PLCs). Being under the German influence,35 its principal 
goal is to secure creditors36 by introducing a minimum capital requirement of 
25000 EUR,37 along with a set of various capital maintenance and alteration 
rules.38 The system of capital distributions39 is based exclusively on an ex ante 
30 Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 6; Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 3.
31 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1.; Ferran, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 528. 
32 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5) p. 38.
33 Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 6.
34 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 928. In case of mistatements in prospectus, a shareholder may 
seek damages in the form of a return of the amount equal to the amount he originally paid for 
the contested shares in the secondary market, and ask the company to take those shares back. 
Given that the provisions of the Second Company Law Directive serve to regulate only internal 
relations between an investee company and an investor, and not disputes arising from a regular 
sale contract, those rules do not contravene national provisions on civil liability for damages 
even if, it seems, damages litigation would imply the return of the amount equal to the original 
share purchase price and share redemption. Such return is not a return of the paid-in amount. It 
represents the investee’s civil law obligation to compensate the investor for damages he suffered 
in the course of regular (non-transparent, though) course of business. Such a ‘share buy-back’ 
does not aim to undermine the share capital. Hence, the corresponding return of the original 
share price to the investor does not constitute unlawful distribution. See Judgment of the Court 
(Second Chamber), Alfred Hirmann v Immofinanz AG, C-174/12, EU:C:2013:856, paras. 27, 
28, 31 and 32. See more in Horak, H.; Dumančić, K.; Poljanec, K.: Modernizacija i usklađivanje 
prava društava u Republici Hrvatskoj sa pravnom stečevinom Europske unije i načelo transpar-
entnosti podataka, in Zbornik radova: II. Međunarodna konferencija Bosna i Hercegovina i 
euroatlantske integracije. Trenutni izazovi i perspektive, Bihać, 2014, pp. 582-587.
35 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 44.
36 Codification, recital 40.
37 Codification, Art 45. para. 1.
38 Codification, ch. IV.
39 The term ‘distribution’ refers in particular to the dividend payment and payment of in-
terests relating to shares. See Codification, Art. 56 para 4. Such a non-exhaustive wording 
suggests that ‘distribution’ may include any other mean of capital returns to the shareholders, 
e.g. acquisition of the company’s own shares (share buy-backs) and capital reductions (capital 
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‘two-fold’ balance sheet test. It consists of the enhanced net asset test40 and 
accumulating running account profits test (‘partial earned surplus test’).41 The 
enhanced net asset test is based on the premise that no distribution to share-
holders may be executed when on the closing date of the last financial year the 
net assets as set out in the company’s annual accounts are or, following such 
a distribution, would become, lower than the amount of the subscribed capital 
plus undistributable legal or statutory capital reserves.42 Besides, the amount 
intended for distribution may not exceed the profits at the end of the last fi-
nancial year plus any profits brought forward and sums drawn from reserves 
available for this purpose, less any losses brought forward and sums placed to 
reserve in accordance with the law or the statutes.43 
The rationale behind the balance sheet test is to assure the creditors that the 
minimum subscribed capital and mandatory reserves (in fact, the equivalent 
net assets) shall not be distributed to shareholders in the course of trading but 
maintained in the company.44 The regime, however, applies only to PLCs.45 
There is virtually no harmonization of rules on the creditor protection in rela-
tion to private companies.46 Such an approach implies that the Member States 
are allowed to design their own rules on the asset distribution in private lim-
ited liability companies (LLCs). Many of them, including Germany, signifi-
cantly relaxed the capital maintenance rules with regard to private limited 
liability companies (mini GmbHs/simple LLCs). It should be also noted that 
the harmonized rules on capital maintenance with regard to PLCs provide only 
writing-downs). Therefore, the concept of distribution, as provided in the Codification, is a 
broad one. It covers at least dividend distribution and interest payment regulated by the general 
rules on distribution (Codification, arts 56-58), companies’ acquisitions of their own shares or 
share buy-backs (Codification, arts. 59-67), and capital reduction (Codification, arts. 68-83).
40 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5) pp. 982, 1002.
41 Ibid., pp. 969; 1002. ‘Partial’ due to the fact that under the Second Company Law Directive 
share premiums were not considered as undistributable share capital but rather distributable 
capital reserves. Ibid., pp. 983; 1002.
42 Codification, Art. 56 para. 1.
43 Codification, Art. 56 para. 3.
44 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 54-55.
45 Codification, Art. 44 in conjunction with Annex I.
46 Gerner-Beuerle C. et al.: Study on the Law Applicable to Companies Final Report, Direc-
torate-General for Justice and Consumers (European Commission) and the London School of 
Economics and Political Sciences, June 2016, p. 221, available at [https://op.europa.eu/en/publi-
cation-detail/-/publication/259a1dae-1a8c-11e7-808e-01aa75ed71a1], accessed on 04/06/2020. 
Hereinafter referred to as the Company Law Study. However, Germany decided to extend the 
scope of the Codification to private limited companies (‘GmbHs’).
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for a minimum protection of creditors,47 meaning that EU Member States are 
allowed to introduce additional, complementary safeguards for asset distribu-
tion with regard to PLCs. Various options in this regard will be in the focus of 
the following parts of the paper.
2.2. THE THEORY MEETS CRITICS
Apart from the Germans, who favor the present rules-based approach concern-
ing PLCs,48 most academic literature has challenged the merits of the existing 
EU capital maintenance regime for PLCs, considering it inappropriate for se-
curing creditor protection. Several key points are worth considering here.
2.2.1. SHARE CAPITAL AS FICTITIOUS GUARANTEE
The fact that the founders of the company once invested a certain amount 
of equity capital into the company does not mean that the same amount has 
remained in the company, or that the net assets structure has not altered over 
time.49 The fixed, nominal amount declared in the court register on company 
formation (or subsequent capital increase) does not necessarily reflect the actu-
al amount or value of the company’s assets at the time the money is advanced 
to the company.50 However, what does matter to the creditors is the company’s 
actual net assets structure.51 In simple terms, no ‘guarantee’ function can be as-
sociated with the share capital.52 A voluntary (‘adjusting’) creditor (e.g. banks 
or suppliers) would need to refer to the company’s overall financial statements 
to get a real impression of the company’s financial viability.53 As voluntary 
creditors pay attention to the insolvency risks and the future cash flows rather 
than to the historic capital contributions, this security measure is therefore not 
tailored to the actual commercial needs54 and has no reasonable link to the 
company’s long term financial viability.55 What the legal capital rules, how-
47 Codification, recital 3.
48 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 61.
49 Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 42.
50 Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 10.
51 Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 41.
52 Winter Report, p. 23; Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 41; Jakšić; Petrović, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1114.
53 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 60. 
54 Winter Report, p. 24; Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 938.; Ferran, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 528-529. 
55 Winter Report, p. 25; Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 938.; A KPMG study commissioned by 
the EU Commission in 2006 revealed that EU companies did not consider the EU legal cap-
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ever, can do is to force the shareholders to pay-up and keep the equity once 
invested as share capital.56 Moreover, they can prevent excessive asset distribu-
tions.57 Nonetheless, they cannot prevent a company from becoming insolvent 
due to bad market conditions, directors’ wrongs, or shareholders’ mindless 
behavior.58 As for the involuntary (‘non-adjusting’) creditors (e.g. tort victims 
or the State), the tortfeasor’s minimum share capital paid on formation is not of 
much use for satisfying their claims by the time when the cause of action takes 
place. Instead, they hope for third-party liability insurances.59 The additional 
objection regarding the function of the legal capital rules comes from the fact 
that the amount of the EU minimum capital has remained unrevised for the 
last forty years, and hence might have completely lost its purpose over time 
due to changing economic and monetary trends in the EU. 60 Therefore, on the 
one hand, legal capital rules are of little use for the creditors, as they do not 
commensurate with their actual needs, and, on the other hand, are taxing for 
controlling shareholders and/or directors of big public companies, who receive 
scarce dividends.61 
ital rules as being of much practical relevance for the assessment of viability of a company. 
They relied instead to figures such as ‘net equity’ and ‘market capitalisation’. KPMG Feasi-
bility Study on an Alternative to the Capital Maintenance Regime Established by the Second 
Company Law Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 and an Examination of the Im-
pact on Profit Distribution of the new EU-accounting Regime: Main Report, p. 2. Available at 
[https://lse.rl.talis.com/items/0FE92D26-066F-2FD8-C723-2B5F1B5F28D1.html], accessed 
on 04/06/2020. Hereinafter referred to as the KPMG Study. However, it was argued that share 
capital was necessary for equity financing, and that it did not constitute a barrier to the distribu-
tion of excess capital. Ibid., p. 3. Moreover, the administrative costs of the systems maintained 
under the recast Second Company Law Directive were not considered high. Thus, costs item 
did not seem to play a key role in determining whether the transition to an alternative model 
would actually benefit EU businessess by reducing administrative burdens. Ibid., p. 6.
56 Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 46-47.
57 Ibid., p. 47; Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 38.
58 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 38.; Likewise Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 518; Barbić, op. 
cit. (n. 24), p. 45.
59 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 932; Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 12-13.
60 The EU institutions should consider revisiting the minimum capital requirement every 
five years. Codification, Art. 45, para. 2. For an extensive analysis of this problem see Rodés 
Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 50-53.
61 Hopt, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 29, and the authors cited therein.
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2.2.2. SHARE CAPITAL AS DISPROPORTIONATE INCORPORATION 
DETERRENT 
Scarcity of sufficient resources to meet the prescriptive minimum capital re-
quirement might deter individuals, including small and medium-sized entre-
preneurs (SMEs), from engaging in entrepreneurial activity and gaining access 
to limited liability.62 Such a discouraging effect of national legal capital rules 
has led over the years to major capital outflows from continental jurisdictions 
to the UK. Instead of incorporating their business at home, small entrepreneurs 
had decided to incorporate their businesses as private companies in the UK, 
where legal capital rules for such companies were considered less restrictive.63 
In the aftermath of Centros, Űberseeing, and Inspire Art cases, countries such 
as France, Germany, Spain (and Croatia, following the Germans) have engaged 
in defensive corporate lawmaking and significantly reduced the minimum cap-
ital requirement for private companies64 to prevent local SMEs from moving 
their businesses abroad.65 
2.2.3. SHARE CAPITAL AS A MECHANISTIC DISTRIBUTION 
YARDSTICK
The present concept of EU legal capital rules may also be considered too me-
chanic and hence detached from the company’s actual economic prospects. 
The ‘undistributable reserve’ concept66 of the balance sheet test relies solely 
on the company’s financial accounts, leaving non-accounting parameters (e.g. 
62 Winter Report, p. 25; Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 11.
63 Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 3.
64 Ringe, W. G.: Corporate Mobility in the European Union – A Flash in the Pan? An Em-
pirical Study on the Success of Lawmaking and Regulatory Competition, Ringe, Oxford Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 34/2013; European Company and Financial Law Review 2013; 
Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 34/2013; University of Oslo Faculty of Law Re-
search Paper No. 2013-19, 2013, [https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2291860],  pp. 8-11, available at 
[https://ssrn.com/abstract=2247323], accessed 09/06/2020; Horak, H.; Dumančić, K.; Šafran-
ko, Z.: Komparativni osvrt na jednostavno društvo s ograničenom odgovornošću, Pravo i 
porezi, 22 (4), 2013, p. 37; Jakšić, Petrović, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1110-1112.
65 About the origin of the phenomenon of ‘regulatory arbitrage’ see, among others, Armour, 
op. cit. (n. 5), p. 17; Bratton, W. W.; McCahery, J. A.; Vermeulen, E. P. M.: How Does Corporate 
Mobility Affect Lawmaking?, ECGI - Law Working Paper No. 91/2008; Georgetown Law and 
Economics Research Paper No. 1086667; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 2008-01, 2008, [https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1086667], pp. 3-37, available at [https://
ssrn.com/abstract=1086667], accessed 09/06/2020; Horak et al., op. cit. (n. 64), p. 37; Ringe, 
op. cit. (n. 64), pp. 2-39.
66 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 938; Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 55.
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future cash flow, expected market conditions, off-balance items such as pro-
spective and contingent liabilities, etc.) outside its scope.67 Such a mechanical68 
approach may lead to a company being prejudiced from paying dividends not-
withstanding the fact that it is actually capable of paying dividends without 
compromising its solvency prospects.69 On the other hand, restrictions on dis-
tributions are ill-targeted for big companies having rather modest minimum 
capital. Such companies may easily satisfy the mandatory (though completely 
inapt) level of undistributable capital and still engage in excessive dividend 
payment.70 
Deficiency of heavily relying on financial accounts has gained particular traction 
after the adoption of the fair value international financial reporting standard/
accounting standard (IFRS/IAS no. 13) for financial statements.71 The fair value 
measurement relies on re-measurements following changes in relevant market 
prices or equivalent measurement parameters.72 It fluctuates and does not reflect 
the fundamental value of a specific asset.73 This standard is particularly inappro-
priate for declaring the actual value of financial assets in situations of high mar-
ket instability, as it introduces volatility into the company’s financial statements, 
including the balance sheet, resulting in the recording of unrealized profits and 
losses.74 Such volatility, even if it reflects actual variations in assets value, might, 
however, not be realized in the short term, and can be only of temporary nature. 
On the other hand, recording of unrealized losses may further lead to the reduc-
tion of share capital below the lower threshold and force shareholders to imple-
ment measures such as re-capitalization, or even company dissolution, in spite 
of the fact that the company as such is not insolvent,75  and the ‘losses’ recorded 
67 Along the same lines Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 55. Rickford argues that the net assets 
test is to be operated strictly by reference to company’s accounts while it is less clear whether 
the earned surplus test is supposed to operate along the same lines. See Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), 
p. 938. 
68 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 938.
69 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 55.
70 Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 518.
71 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 
2002 on the application of international accounting standards, (OJ L 243, 11/9/2002), pp. 1–4.
72 KPMG Study, p. 7.
73 Strampelli, G.: The IAS/IFRS After the Crisis: Limiting the Impact of Fair Value Account-
ing on Companies’ Capital, European Company and Financial Law Review, De Gruyter, 8(1) 
2011, [https://doi.org/10.1515/ecfr.2011.1], pp. 3-4, available at [https://ideas.repec.org/a/bpj/
eucflr/v8y2011i1p1-29n1.html], accessed on 04/06/2020. 
74 Ibid., p. 4. 
75 Ibid., p. 5. 
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do not correspond to the real devaluation in company’s assets.76 In simple terms, 
the fair value approach is problematic for the calculation of distributable profits, 
as it produces the gap between the company’s real capacity to pay distributions 
and the outcome under the applicable accounting standard.77 It somehow distorts 
the balance sheet test, making the results either too generous (in case of assets’ 
overestimation) or too restricted (in case of assets’ underestimation), and that 
does not reflect the actual prospects of solvency.78 The accounting standards are 
simply not intended to serve as a basis for a distribution policy79 and have come 
under a lot of strain recently.80 
2.3. OTHER MECHANISMS OF CREDITOR PROTECTION IN PUBLIC 
LIMITED COMPANIES
Doubts rose about the practical meaning of the present EU legal capital rules 
have prompted ideas on the possibility of introducing less mechanical and 
more ‘commercial’ mechanisms of creditor protection in cases of capital dis-
tributions. The following subchapters shall focus on common contractual, 
property, and corporate means of creditor protection, where special regard 
shall be given to the solvency test.
2.3.1. CONTRACTUAL AND PROPERTY MECHANISMS
As has been stated earlier, the legal capital rules do not distinguish volun-
tary from involuntary creditors but impose a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach on all 
stakeholders of the debtor company (erga omnes approach).81  Such an implied 
collective covenant82 does not, however, take into consideration the specific 
needs of certain creditors. Therefore, the practice has turned to tailor-made 
solutions at the intersection of contract and property law.  
76 Ibid., p. 11. 
77 Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 508; Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 938.
78 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 938.
79 KPMG Study, p. 7.
80 On the need to revisit the current accounting regime see in Strampelli, op. cit. (n. 73), p. 
11.; Klein, I.: A Change in Accounting, A Change in Law, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 
(DJCL), 42(1) 2017, pp. 20-23, available at [https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2840968], accessed on 04/06/2020.
81 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 88.
82 Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 8.
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As far as voluntary (‘adjusting’) creditors are concerned, they mostly rely on 
private contractual safeguards rather than on mandatory legal capital rules.83 
Such practice is widely spread across Anglo-American jurisdictions, and not 
unfamiliar (however, less usual) in continental Europe. Powerful creditors such 
as banks mostly contract for protection to prevent potentially risky investments 
by the shareholders. Financial covenants in bank loans usually impose distri-
bution restrictions upon the debtor company either directly - by tying dividend 
payments to the company’s net earnings,84 - or often indirectly - by asking the 
company to maintain a certain level of liquidity (level of cash-flow), profitabili-
ty, net assets;85 a certain financial ratio (relation of net assets to debt), etc.86 
Alongside the bank covenants, voluntary creditors can contract for third-party 
guarantees,87 letters of comfort, or charges. Third-party guarantees will often 
come in a form of suretyship or bank guarantee. The latter is considered by 
the case law as an efficient alternative to the mandatory rules on creditor pro-
tection.88 Likewise, the creditor’s loan provided to the debtor company may 
be secured utilizing a ‘strong’ letter of comfort. Here a third party (the issuer, 
usually a parent company) takes an enforceable obligation (unilateral promise) 
to provide assistance (e.g. by transferring funds, commodities, or inventions; 
by increasing capital, etc.) to the debtor company (usually a daughter compa-
ny) to help the company gaining and maintaining liquidity needed to meet the 
creditor’s claims (the letter’s recipient, usually a bank) as they fall due. Unlike 
suretyship, the third party is bound only to keep the given promise and act 
accordingly, but shall not be considered liable for direct payment of the credit 
in case of the debtor company’s default. 89 
83 Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 514.
84 Armour, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 8.
85 KPMG Study, p. 95 (Poland); p. 115 (Sweden). p. 181 (Delaware); p. 199 (California), p. 234 
(Australia); p. 254 (New Zeland).
86 Ibid., p. 48 (France); p. 74 (Germany); p. 141 (UK); p. 180 (Delaware); p. 214 (Canada).
87 Ibid., p. 74 (Germany)
88 Centros,  para 37 (as an alternative to mandatory minimum capital); Judgment of the Court 
(Grand Chamber) of 25 October 2017, Proceedings brought by Polbud - Wykonawstwo sp. z o.o., 
C-106/16, EU:C:2017:804, para. 58 (as an alternative to mandatory liquidation). However, issuance of 
a bank guarantee will often be accompanied by the bank’s request to receive in return a correspond-
ing collateral from the debtor company. It is argued that such alternative may be as burdensome for 
the company as the provisions on the mandatory capital maintenance or liquidation. Markovinović, 
H.; Bilić, A.: The transfer of a company seat to a different member state in the light of the recent 
‘Polbud’ decision, InterEULawEast: Journal for International and European Law, Economics and 
Market Integrations, 5(2), 2018, [https://doi.org/10.22598/iele.2018.5.2.3], pp. 117-118.
89 See more in Jakšić, T.: Čvrste pokroviteljske izjave – pravna narav ugovora, predmet i 
povreda obveze pokrovitelja, stečajni postupak i postupak izvanredne uprave, Zbornik Prav-
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In the Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, a floating charge (in US terms, a floating 
lien) has developed as a common means of securing corporate loans.90 This 
charge ‘floats’ over the debtor company’s overall (current and future) assets, 
but enables the debtor to freely dispose of the assets in the regular course of 
trading until the crystallizing event (e.g. default in payment) occurs.91 In 1994 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development developed an ‘enter-
prise charge’ along the lines of the UK floating charge. This model-floating 
charge is available only to companies92 and was intended to serve as a set of 
boilerplate rules for transition states of South-Eastern Europe.93
The bank covenants and charges are available only to major creditors having a 
significant bargaining power. As far as non-voluntary creditors are concerned, 
it is argued that their position may be secured by mandatory insurances for 
tort liability and directors’ mandatory insurance policies.94 However, imposing 
mandatory insurances would lead to significant costs for companies, as the 
insurance premium could be quite high given the potential substantive and 
personal scope of tort liability.95 Such a high market entrance fee would leave 
SMEs outside the market, and act as a deterrent factor resembling the mini-
mum capital requirement. Therefore, such an approach does not seem an apt 
means of securing creditors’ rights.
2.3.2. COMPANY LAW MECHANISMS
Transparency and disclosure of corporate information are considered an instru-
ment of shareholders’ protection and control of management and supervisory 
boards, whereas their purpose in the capital market is to ensure trustworthy 
and accurate information for the entire market, most notably for the capital 
nog fakulteta Sveučilišta u Rijeci, 39(2), 2018, [https://doi.org/10.30925/zpfsr.39.2.3], pp. 775 
et seq.
90 Čulinović-Herc, E.: Zalaganje imovine trgovačkih društava: engleski Floating Charge i 
Enterprise Charge model-zakona o osiguranju potraživanja Europske banke, Zbornik Prav-
nog fakulteta u Zagrebu, 45(1), 1995, p. 94; KPMG Study, p. 141.
91 Čulinović-Herc, op. cit. (n. 90), pp. 102, 106. The floating charge shall convert into a fixed 
charge over the assets which are part of the debtor’s inventory at the moment of crystallization.
92 Model Law on Secured Transactions, Art. 6.6. Available at [https://www.ebrd.com/what-
we-do/legal-reform/access-to-finance/transactions.html], accessed 15/06/2020.
93 Čulinović-Herc, op. cit. (n. 90), pp. 94; 115-118. On the floating charge under Croatian 
property law see more in Gavella, N. (ed), Stvarno pravo, Svezak 1., Narodne novine, 2007, pp. 
283-291.
94 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 83-86.
95 Ibid., p. 87.
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supply-side - potential creditors and investors. However, unlike contractual 
and property arrangements, those requirements do not serve as a means of di-
rect enforcement of creditors’ rights. They serve as ex ante measures,96 aiming 
at creating an atmosphere of mutual trust in the capital market and surveil-
lance over the recipient company’s affairs. They enable creditors to reach an 
informed decision on corporate financing, and, in return, increase the debtor’s 
prospects for getting cheaper loans as the prospects of default risk are made 
public.97 However, the static picture provided by the financial reports, costly 
and time-consuming processes of checking data,98 and heterogeneity of finan-
cial reporting caused by the ‘opt-in’ IFRS reporting regime for certain types of 
companies99 may be considered as the regime’s weak points. 
Securing creditors’ rights may also be achieved through sound corporate gov-
ernance practices. The EU corporate framework encourages the use of com-
plementary soft law measures which continue to address internal corporate 
governance matters at the point where the legal act has set a limit.100 It pro-
motes the application of corporate governance codes by requiring listed com-
panies to refer in their corporate governance statement to an applicable code 
and report on its application on a ‘comply or explain’ basis.101 The application 
of soft law measures requires continuous monitoring by regulatory authorities, 
which should check whether the declaration of compliance with the recom-
mendations published in the code actually exists, and take action in case of 
inaccuracies.102  
96 Ibid., p. 80.
97 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
98 Ibid., pp. 81-83.
99 Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 
2002 on the application of international accounting standards, (OJ L 243, 11/9/2002), Art. 5 
leaves to the Member States the margin to decide whether or not (‘may permit or require’) to 
extend the application of the IAS/IFRS to individual annual accounts of publicly traded com-
panies and individual and consolidated accounts of non-publicly traded companies, respective-
ly. Therefore, there is a wide heterogeneity in the EU on how relevant profits in the ‘optional’ 
financial statements are determined for dividend-distribution purposes. KPMG Study, p. 320.
100 Barbić, J. et al.: Korporativno upravljanje: osnove dobre prakse vođenja društva kapitala, 
Zagreb, 2008, p. 93.
101 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
the annual financial statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of cer-
tain types of undertakings, amending Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with EEA 
relevance, (OJ L 182, 29/06/2013), Art. 20 para. 1 (b).
102 Horak H.; Bodiroga Vukobrat, N.: Comply or Explain Experiences of the EU Member 
States, in: Horak et al., Hrvatsko i europsko pravo društava/Croatian & European Company 
Law, Zbornik radova/Collection of Proceedings, p. 40, available at [http://www.efzg.unizg.
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However, the voluntary nature and implementation of soft law measures make 
them rather weak security against shareholders’ and/or directors’ rash behav-
ior, comparing to more traditional ex post corporate remedies such as direc-
tors’ liabilities, restitution of unlawfully paid dividends, or piercing the corpo-
rate veil. Directors’ liability is a mirror image of the fiduciary duty they owe 
to the company. Directors, being the company’s agents, must primarily act in 
the best interest of the company.103 The duty of care implies they should devote 
sufficient time, care, and diligence to manage the company while acting on a 
basis of adequate information. They should possess the necessary skills and 
experience to reach a sound business decision, and should carefully consid-
er the likely outcome(s) thereof.104 By focusing on the company’s well-being, 
they indirectly keep the position of the company’s stakeholders (employees, 
the state, creditors) safe. Nonetheless, they will be held liable in case of a faulty 
breach of company law principles, which have led to the company’s insolven-
cy and, consequently, reduced prospects of meeting the creditors’ claims.105 
Still, at least in continental Europe, the directors shall not be held liable for 
unlawfully distributed dividends,106 as such violations do not stem from the 
abuse of the board competencies but rather from shareholders’ opportunistic 
conduct. Shareholders remain solely liable for unlawful distributions if they 
knew or ought to have known the unlawfulness of the distribution received.107 
Besides, shareholders would also be held liable for the company’s liabilities 
towards the creditors if they engaged in malicious actions aiming at reducing 
hr/userdocsimages/PRA/2017%20-%20novi%20web/Publikacije/hrvatsko_i_europsko_pra-
vo_drutava_2.pdf], accessed on 04/06/2020.
103 Agency relationship in corporate governance is defined by the relationship of the principal 
(shareholder) and his agent (director). The principal entrusts the performance of management 
tasks to his agent assuming that he, being a professional, will perform the task better so to 
achieve the desired outcome. See more in Tipurić, D.: Nadzorni odbor i korporativno upravl-
janje, Zagreb, 2006, p. 96.
104 See  Horak, H.; Dumančić K.: Introduction of the Business Judgement Rule into Croatian 
Legislation, in: Horak et al., Hrvatsko i europsko pravo društava/Croatian & European Com-
pany Law, Zbornik radova/Collection of Proceedings, p. 120, available at [http://www.efzg.
unizg.hr/userdocsimages/PRA/2017%20-%20novi%20web/Publikacije/hrvatsko_i_europs-
ko_pravo_drutava_2.pdf], accessed on 04/06/2020; Gerner-Beuerle, C.; Paech, P.; Schuster, 
E. P.: Study on Directors Duties and Liability, London School of Economics and Political 
Scienes, London, April 2013,  p. 11, available at [http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50438/1/__Libfile_
repository_Content_Gerner Beuerle,%20C_Study%20on%20directors%E2%80%99%20du-
ties%20and%20liability(lsero).pdf], accessed 06/07/2020. 
105 Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 88; 90.
106 Ibid., p. 93.
107 Ibid., p. 91.
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the company’s prospects of meeting the creditors’ claims.108 Both remedies 
serve as civil-law safeguards for the restitution of the share capital to the com-
pany and provide more chances for the actual enforcement of the creditors’ 
right. A problem, however, may arise at the litigation level, as directors’ fault 
and shareholders’ unfair demeanor is hard to prove. It seems even harder to 
pierce the legal personality veil, as courts are mostly wary about making the 
shareholders liable for the company’s debts.109
2.3.3. SOLVENCY TEST  
Stand-alone balance sheet test under the traditional capital maintenance rules 
does not reflect a true commercial position of the company (‘trading solvency’) 
but rather a ‘balance sheet solvency’. The ‘balance sheet solvency’ relies heavily 
on current financial indicators, i.e. on-the-balance-sheet items, leaving, however 
so-called off-the-balance-sheet-items completely out of sight (most notably, busi-
ness prospects of the company). On-the-balance-sheet items are, moreover, high-
ly dependent on the controversial fair value accounting method, which may re-
sult in underestimation or overestimation of the on-the-balance-sheet items, and 
therefore negatively influences both the financial sustainability of the company 
and shareholders’ legitimate expectations to receive the dividend.  Therefore, the 
balance sheet test is a mechanical, unreliable, and even detrimental restriction 
on dividend distribution. Private law mechanisms have also shown certain weak-
nesses. They are either reserved for major creditors, voluntary, or difficult to 
enforce. Therefore, in order to overcome the disadvantages of the balance sheet 
test, national legislators should seek for a distribution yardstick that will not rely 
solely on the accounting numbers entered on the balance sheet of the company’s 
annual financial statements but would rather ask directors to assess ex ante the 
potential outcomes of the intended distribution in light of the actual economic 
surroundings of the company, where special regard should be given to the com-
pany’s solvency prospects. The solvency assessment should, moreover, render 
the directors liable in the case where no reasonable economic grounds for div-
idend distribution existed, resulting in compromising the company’s solvency. 
Anglo-American company laws110 have undertaken far the biggest step towards 
introducing solvency standards into dividend distribution schemes. Under US 
law, the distribution shall not take place if, after giving it effect, the company 
would not be able to meet its debts as they fall due in the regular course of 
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., p. 92.
110 Save for British law, which has followed the EU regime. 
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trading.111 Moreover, a proposed distribution must meet the balance sheet test 
requiring that, following the distribution, assets must equal or exceed liabil-
ities plus any amount needed to meet preferential shareholders’ claims if the 
company were to be dissolved at the time of distribution.112 Application of such 
test is underpinned by directors’ personal liability for payment of excessive 
dividend.113 Hence, unlike under the continental regime, a company operating 
under US law shall rely on the twofold cumulative (trading/cash flow) solven-
cy and simple (bare) net asset test (balance sheet solvency).114 Such a regime 
makes it harder for US companies to distribute dividends, as they should meet 
a double burden test. Not just that a company has to meet the balance sheet 
requirements but the board should also know whether the company will be 
able to meet its liabilities following the distribution. However, no concerns 
have been raised yet with regard to this system. In fact, the MBCA-like dis-
tribution rules were adopted in Canadian,115 Australian,116 and New Zealand 
legislation.117 Hence, the US model of the twofold cumulative solvency test, 
111 Model Business Corporation Act (2016 Revision), December 9, 2016, § 6.40 (c) (1). Avail-
able at [https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/business_law/cor-
plaws/2016_mbca.authcheckdam.pdf], accessed 13/06/2020. Hereinafter referred to as the 
MBCA. This act serves as a model for the states to frame their own state corporation laws. 
KPMG Study, p. 155.
112 MBCA, § 6.40 (c) (2).
113 MBCA, §§ 8.30 and 8.33. See more details in Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 1017-1018; Rodés 
Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 40. 
114 Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 969. The concept of legal capital does not serve as a means of 
creditor protection in state corporation acts either. California completely abandoned legal cap-
ital rules and par value shares. Two other models – New York and Delaware – are less extreme. 
Both have retained legal capital rules (in particular, par value shares) but not for the purposes 
of creditor protection. Besides, New York has retained a modest minimum capital require-
ment. Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5),  pp. 1019, 1021; Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 40-41. Instead, 
creditors usually rely on surplus and net profit tests (Delaware), liquidity test and balance sheet 
tests (California), alongside self-regulated contractual arrangements such as loan covenants, 
anti-fraud laws, lifting the corporate veil theory, and bankruptcy codes. Rickford, op. cit. (n. 
5),  pp. 1020-1022; Rodés Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 41.; KPMG Study, pp. 167-188.
115 See Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-44 (last amended January 1, 
2020), § 42. Available at [https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/PDF/C-44.pdf], accessed 16/06/2020. 
See more in Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1023; KPMG Study, p. 207.
116 See the Corporations Act 2001, No. 50, 2001, Compilation No. 81, Vol. 1, September 28, 
2017, § 254T. Available at [https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2017C00328/Download], 
accessed 16/06/2020. Australia relies on the solvency test accompanied by the earned surplus 
(operating profit) test, as dividend may be paid only out of profits. KPMG Study, pp. 222-223. 
Ferran, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 541.
117 The Companies Act 1993, No. 105, September 28, 1993, § 4. Available at [http://www.leg-
islation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0105/latest/DLM319998.html], accessed 16/06/2020. Besides, 
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alongside the solvency certificate, stands for a common Anglo-American alter-
native to the traditional capital maintenance model. As such, it has also been 
a primary point of reference for both academic118 and legislative119 proposals 
for reform of creditor protection at the EU level. Recently, a solvency certif-
icate has been introduced into the EU cross border conversion legislation to 
protect creditors against the risk of the insolvency of the company following a 
cross border transaction.120 The solvency-based approach has also influenced 
national reform movements across mainland Europe. Namely, a tendency has 
emerged across the EU to reduce or abolish the minimum capital and creditor 
protection mechanisms grounded on strict company law rules, in particular for 
LLCs.121 
For example, the Netherlands has completely abandoned the minimum capital 
requirement for private companies and replaced it with the balance sheet and 
solvency tests as a novel creditor protection mechanism.122 Countries like the 
UK have turned to a solvency based approach for capital reductions in private 
companies.123 Public limited companies - the core of traditional legal capi-
tal rules – have also witnessed remarkable changes. France, for example, has 
abandoned the minimum share capital for simplified public limited companies 
(société par actions simplifiée).124 However, the provisions on public limited 
directors authorizing the payment shall sign a certificate that the company will remain solvent, 
stating their grounds (‘solvency certificate’). If there were no reasonable grounds for assessing 
that the company will meet the solvency test (i.e. maintain both trading and balance sheet 
solvency) at the time of implementation of the certificate, the directors will be held personally 
liable for return of excessive dividends which cannot be recovered from the shareholders. Ibid., 
§ 56 (2). See more in Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5),  pp. 972-975; 1025; KPMG Study, pp. 242-243; 
Jakšić, Petrović, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 1105-1106.
118 KPMG Study, p. 307 (summary of academic proposals); Hopt, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 18;  Rodés 
Saldaña, op. cit. (n. 5),  p. 114; Ferran, op. cit. (n. 5),  p. 538; Petrović; Jakšić, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 
1115 (for ltds). For a critical appraisal of US solutions in the continental context see Jovanovič, 
op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 538-539.
119 AP 2003, p. 20; the SPE Proposal, Art. 21. 
120 See Directive (EU) 2019/2121 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 No-
vember 2019 amending Directive (EU) 2017/1132 as regards cross-border conversions, mergers 
and divisions (Text with EEA relevance) (OJ L 321, 12/12/2019), pp. 1–44, recital 25. Criti-
cally on such approach Akšamović, D.; Šimunović, L.; Kuna, I.: Cross-Border Movement of 
Companies: The New Rules on Cross Border Conversion, EU and comparative law issues and 
challenges series (ECLIC), 3, 2019, [http://doi.org/10.25234/eclic], pp. 958-959, [available at 
https://hrcak.srce.hr/ojs/index.php/eclic/article/view/9038/5121], accessed 16/06/2020.
121 Company Law Study, p. 222. 
122 See more on this in Ringe, op. cit. (n. 64), p. 10; Jakšić, Petrović, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1109. 
123 See more in Ferran, op. cit. (n. 5), pp. 530-535.
124 See the French Commercial Code, as last amended on June 5, 2020, Art. 227-1 in con-
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companies (sociétés anonymes)   remain applicable to simplified PLCs only if 
those provisions are compatible with the simplified regime.125.As the idea of 
the simplified regime was to leave the traditional share capital rules, which rely 
on the balance sheet test, it is doubtful whether the current solution – under 
which the balance sheet test from Art. 232-11, para 3 of the Commercial Code 
shall also apply to simplified companies -is meaningful for dividend distribu-
tion under the simplified regime. As abandonment of the legal capital rules 
would suggest introducing an alternative mechanism(s) for prudent dividend 
distribution, the simplified regime should be replaced with a solvency test. 
In March 2020 Poland also introduced a new simplified public limited compa-
ny (gprosta spółka akcyjn) with only 1 Polish zloty minimum capital required 
for company formation. Save for certain limitations, shareholders can now get 
a dividend from the assets of a simple public limited company, including the 
legal capital.126  
In light of the foregoing considerations, the following chapter will give a closer 
look at the Croatian capital maintenance regime, and the reform potentials 
thereof.
3. SOLVENCY TEST AND CROATIAN COMPANY LAW
3.1. PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANIES
3.1.1. STATE OF THE ART
Croatian company law follows the Germanic legal capital system. Through 
German solutions, Croatia has implemented EU company law rules on legal 
capital.127 Domestic rules on dividend distribution for public limited compa-
nies are based on the prescriptive twofold cumulative enhanced balance sheet 
(net asset) test and ‘modified’ earned surplus (accumulated running profit and 
junction with Art. 224-2. Available at [https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTex-
te=LEGITEXT000005634379&dateTexte=20130701], accessed 16/06/2020. See also Ringe, 
op. cit. (n. 64), p. 9; Jakšić, Petrović, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1111.
125 Arg. ex the French Commercial Code, Art. 227-1, para 3.
126 See more in Mazgaj, M.; Mucha, A.: The New Kid on the Block on the European Market 
for Corporate Legal Forms: A Polish Laboratory for a Modern Close Corporation, European 
Company Law (EUCL), 17(2), 2020, pp. 45-52, available at [https://kluwerlawonline.com/jour-
nalarticle/European+Company+Law/17.2/EUCL2020008], accessed on 06/07/2020.
127 Barbić, J.: Utjecaj njemačkog prava na stvaranje hrvatskog prava društava, Zbornik rado-
va Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu, 44(3-4), 2007, p. 354.
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loss account) test.128 The mandatory character of the present EU rules does 
not leave much room for departures thereof.129 However, given the minimum 
harmonization standard of the EU capital maintenance regime, Croatia could 
introduce complementary arrangements for efficient creditor protection with 
regard to PLCs (‘dionička društva’). 
Some of the civil law arrangements have already been put in place, most no-
tably, the remedial schemes. Unless their decision to pay dividend follows the 
prior approval of the general meeting of shareholders, directors shall be jointly 
and severally liable to the company for breach of distribution rules.130 In that 
case, the company’s creditors could claim damages on behalf of the company 
if the company was not able to meet their claims as they fall due.131 Notwith-
standing the directors’ liability, the shareholders are liable for the return of the 
unlawfully paid dividend if the company proves they knew or ought to know 
that they had not been entitled to receive it.132  In case the company is unable 
to pay their outstanding claims as they fall due, the creditors may claim the 
dividend back on behalf of the debtor company.133 Moreover, shareholders’ lia-
bility may arise as a consequence of any kind of malicious undercapitalization 
of the company’s assets which has led to the company becoming insolvent and, 
hence, unable to meet creditors’ claims as they fall due.134 
There are no obstacles for the parties to refer to the conventional contractual or 
property law mechanisms of creditor protection such as floating charges135 and 
bank loan covenants. However, it would not be possible under Croatian law for 
the creditors to contract for direct restrictions on dividend distributions, and 
thereby circumvent strict CA rules. Namely, shareholders are entitled to profit 
128 The Croatian Companies’ Act, (NN no. 111/93, 34/99, 121/99, 52/00, 118/03, 107/07, 
146/08, 137/09, 125/11, 152/11, 111/12, 68/13, 110/15, 40/19), Art. 220 para. 7. Hereinafter re-
ferred to as the CA. Modified due to the fact that Croatia has added available reserves to the 
earned surplus. For the definition of the modified earned surplus test see Rickford, op. cit. (n. 
5), p. 969, footnote 178.
129 Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 537.
130 CA, Art. 252, para. 3, subpara. 2.
131 CA, Art. 252, para. 5.
132 CA, Art. 224, para. 1. 
133 CA, Art 224, para. 2.
134 CA, Art. 10, para. 4.
135 The Act on the Register of Judicial and Public Notaries’ Security Interests on Movables 
and Intangibles, (NN no. 121/05), Art. 38. It should be noted that Croatian floating charge de-
parts from its Anglosaxon role-model, as it may charge only some generic movables stored in a 
designated storage or other premise, hence, not the whole undertaking belonging to the debtor 
company.
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distribution unless the general meeting decided otherwise in accordance with 
the limits prescribed by the law or memorandum of association (emphasis 
added).136 If there are no legal (including balance sheet) or internal (statutory) 
restraints on dividend distribution, shareholders’ meeting has sole discretion 
to decide whether and how much dividend will be paid to the shareholders.137 
Therefore, no contractual covenant could lawfully preclude shareholders from 
the dividend payment. Any private law covenant imposing direct limits on 
the debtor company (e.g. tying the distributable amount to the profit rate or a 
certain percentage of profit) should be hence considered as unlawfully inter-
fering with the competencies vested in the general meeting of shareholders un-
der the strict distribution rules.138 The shareholders’ decision which would be 
grounded on such an unlawfully precluding covenant would be voidable, as the 
decision would contravene the strict distribution rules set out in CA.139 Breach 
of such a precluding contractual covenant could, however, result in civil law 
liability of the company to the creditors (inter partes).
A private law restriction could bind the company’s shareholders by amending 
the company’s memorandum of association with the same qualified majority 
of shareholders’ votes that is required for the memorandum’s amendments. 
In that case, direct distribution restriction would no more be an ‘externally’ 
negotiated clause depriving the shareholders of their legal right, but rather a 
self-imposed collective covenant or term adopted into the basic corporate act, 
binding the shareholders’ meeting.
The majority shareholder, as any other shareholder, has the sole discretion to 
decide whether to vote for dividend payment, how and for what reason. How-
ever, it may be argued that a strong letter of comfort, that binds a majority 
shareholder (i.e. the parent company) not to vote for dividend payment so as 
to maintain the payer company’s liquidity, and thus increase the bank’s pay-
ment prospects, would be precluded for the competences of the shareholders’ 
meeting. Unless the objective (economic) circumstances surrounding the debt-
or company suggested abstaining from dividend payment,140 a letter of this sort 
would directly affect a majority shareholder’s decision on dividend payment to 
the detriment of minority shareholders on grounds other than legal, statutory, 
or economic. It follows that a decision not to distribute dividend does not rely 
solely on the majority shareholder’s sole discretion (whatever the reasons for 
136 CA, Art. 220, para. 6. 
137 Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 1341.
138 Likewise for Germany see KPMG Study, p. 74. 
139 Arg ex CA, arts. 360 para. 1 and 365 para. 1. 
140 Arg ex CA, Art. 365 para. 1. 
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such a decision might be), restraints prescribed by the law (including restraints 
imposed by the mandatory twofold balance sheet test), and the company’s 
memorandum of association. A decision not to pay dividends must employ 
an additional line of reasoning which, for the purposes of this paper, may be 
referred to as the ‘circumstances test’. Otherwise, a decision to withhold div-
idend may be challenged at court as voidable if such a decision deprived (mi-
nority) shareholders from receiving dividend notwithstanding, on the one part, 
that no legal or company’s internal act precluded such payment and, on the 
other part, a judgment of a reasonable business person would suggest a positive 
decision having regard the ‘circumstances’ surrounding the company. Share-
holders could file a civil lawsuit asking the court to declare the withholding 
decision null and void and to bind the company to pay the disputed amount 
to the shareholders. However, if the shareholders asked the court to declare 
the only nullity of the withholding decision, but not the payment of dividend, 
the judgment would not be a valid ground for the payment per se. Instead, the 
company should convene a new general meeting of shareholders and render a 
new decision to distribute dividends, given that the previous one was declared 
null and void.141 
Therefore, under the Croatian distribution rules, a prudent distribution pro-
cess in public limited companies should apply both a twofold positive bal-
ance sheet test and a complementary ex ante ‘circumstances’ test to avoid 
court proceedings declaring the withholding decision null and void.142 The 
CA, however, does not precise what kind of circumstances should influence 
the shareholders’ decision to pay dividends. It may be argued that such an ‘ap-
titude test’ should assess – in the first place - the current economic and finan-
cial circumstances surrounding the company. Such assessment may include 
factors such as the company’s overall financial position (financial risk man-
agement, including price-fluctuation risks, credit risks, cash-flow risks, cur-
rency risks, contingent, and prospective liabilities, supply and demand ratio, 
etc.); foreseeable development of the company; planned investments, research, 
and development (R&D) activities; state of the company’s reserves; expected 
capital alteration activities, share-buy backs programs, security interests over 
third-parties’ property (financial instruments, charges), company’s place in the 
market competition, etc.143 An ample wording of the ‘circumstances’ test from 
Art. 365, para 1 CA allows directors to consider a lot of factors indicating 
the company’s short-term (liquidity) and long-term (solvency) payment pros-
pects, and, therefore, in a way already (though, tacitly) incorporates a ‘com-
141 Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 1390.
142 Arg. ex CA, Art. 220 para. 7 in conjunction with Art. 365 para. 1.
143 Arg. ex CA, Art. 250 (a) para. 3.
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mercial’, solvency-based standards into Croatian distribution rules. However, 
the Croatian distribution rule refers to the overall circumstances surrounding 
the company, and not mere economic/financial indicators. The ‘circumstances 
test’ should additionally review current non-financial (social) indicators sur-
rounding the company’s business such as environmental, labor, public health 
and human rights concerns, anti-corruption and bribery policy, diversity on 
board, geopolitical risks, pending legal reforms, and alike.144 
3.1.2. PROSPECTS
3.1.2.1. Basic Form of Public Limited Company
Despite of the argument that the solvency-based standards are implicitly 
provided under the current CA rules, and should be employed as part of the 
overall ‘circumstances test’, future reforms of Croatian company law should 
consider introducing an explicit provision on trading solvency into the CA 
distribution regime to complement the mandatory balance sheet test and finan-
cial accounts. Corporate directors would be asked to monitor and assess the 
solvency prospects of the company before submitting the distribution proposal 
to the shareholders’ meeting. It would force them to consider trading solven-
cy standards such as market capitalization, expected liabilities, cash flow, etc. 
when rendering a distribution decision, and not mere balance sheet figures 
and financial reports. However, a reference to the balance sheet test should 
precede the trading solvency assessment. If the balance sheet test demonstrates 
(threatening) insolvency, the trading solvency test should not be undertaken, 
especially not with the aim to override the results under the balance sheet test. 
145 The distribution should follow only if both the balance sheet test and trading 
solvency test were met.
The proposed regime would certainly benefit the creditors, as it would prevent 
excessive dividend distribution under the positive balance sheet regime unless 
the trading solvency test confirmed positive results. The incorporation of the 
solvency- based test into the distribution rules would bring current, future, ad-
justing, and non-adjusting creditors on a level playing field, as an ex ante gen-
eral distribution rule would allow both actual (on-balance sheet) and expected 
(prospective or contingent, off-balance-sheet) liabilities to be considered, mak-
ing the distribution neutral and less static. 
144 Arg. ex CA, Art 250 (a) para. 2. See Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 1342.
145 In favor of the more relaxed approach, where the results of the solvency test should override 
the outcomes of the balance sheet test in case the latter demonstrates the balance sheet insol-
vency Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 995; see also KPMG Study, p. 307.
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Furthermore, a distribution scheme relying on trading solvency standards 
would certainly bring long-term financial benefits for the shareholders. It 
would encourage directors of listed companies to carefully consider how a 
commercial approach might contribute to the company’s long-term business 
strategy and its sustainability. The company’s remuneration policy should re-
flect the outcomes of their assessment, rewarding those who employed a sound 
distribution policy while meeting the shareholder’s expectations.146 From that 
point of view, tying the shareholders returns to the assessments of the com-
pany’s actual trading solvency should increase the company’s financial sus-
tainability over some longer period of time, reduce directors’ opportunistic 
behavior, encourage them to take a forward-looking approach, and make the 
shareholders’ stakes more valuable and attractive in the long run.
Given the Anglo-American legal origin of the standard solvency test, partic-
ular attention should be paid to making it compatible with the existing rules 
on distribution in order to avoid possible inconsistencies within the system.147 
Therefore, de lege ferenda solvency test should not be accompanied by the 
solvency statement, as direct transposition of the Anglo-American solutions 
would interfere with the traditional division of competences in public com-
panies.148 Namely, under Anglo-American corporate governance, the board of 
directors has sole discretion to declare distributable profits.149 It shall be solely 
liable for any misstatements affecting the lawfulness of the distribution, along 
with the liability for return of the unlawfully paid dividend. Hence, it makes 
sense to ask the board to state, certify, and publish the company’s foreseeable 
solvency before the distribution takes place.150 However, under the continen-
tal jurisdictions, the division of competences among corporate bodies is less 
‘board-centered’. The shareholder’s meeting is solely competent to render a 
final decision on dividend distribution.151 The sole liability for the return of the 
unlawfully paid dividend remains with the shareholders.152 In such a ‘share-
holder-centered’ distribution scheme it would be hard to introduce a legislative 
solution that would make the directors liable for payments that were made 
without their direct involvement.153 What, however, does make sense is to ask 
146 CA, Art. 247 (a) and 272 (r) para. 1, subpara.1. 
147 Barbić, op. cit. (n. 127) p. 347.
148 The same Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 539.
149 KPMG Study, p. 30 (UK); ibid., pp. 157-159 (US); ibid., p. 168 (Delaware); ibid., p. 190 
(California); ibid., p. 206 (Canada); ibid., p. 224 (Australia); ibid., p. 243 (New Zealand).
150 The same Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 539.
151 The same ibid. See CA, Art. 275 para. 1 subpara. 2.
152 CA, Art. 224, para. 1.
153 The same Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 539.
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the directors to assess the company’s foreseeable solvency (e.g. by referring to 
the company’s solvency prospects in the special section of the annual manage-
ment report)154 before covering the shareholders’ meeting. 
The solvency test could thus serve as a point of reference for the sharehold-
ers once the directors’ distribution proposal is placed on the meeting’s agenda. 
Nonetheless, it would not preclude the meeting’s ultimate responsibility for the 
payment. Shareholders are not tied to the directors’ proposal. They can reject 
it, revise the decision already rendered,155 or even remove the proposal from the 
meeting’s agenda if they disagree with it.156 In any case, they should double-check 
the financial and management reports.157 Unless their order to transfer dividends 
was not based on the shareholders’ approval, the directors would not be liable 
for damages to the company resulting from a shareholders’ decision to distrib-
ute profit.158 Furthermore, it should be noted that creditors’ claims are merely 
accessory to the company’s claim against the directors.159 As there would be no 
liability claim against the directors, the creditors would not succeed with their 
civil lawsuit against the board members either, notwithstanding the fact that the 
company might have become insolvent as a result of the unlawful distribution.160 
3.1.2.2. Novel Form
Under the existing EU capital maintenance regime, the solvency test may serve 
only as a complementary yardstick for dividend distribution in basic public 
limited companies, i.e. those listed in the Annex to the Codification. How-
ever, there are no limitations on introducing such a test as a sole mechanism 
for creditor protection in other (non-listed) corporate forms of public limited 
companies. As stated earlier, some EU Member States have recognized such a 
harmonization gap and decided to introduce a simple public limited company 
having no or modest share capital.161 
154 See CA, Art. 250 (a) paras. 2 and 3 (b).
155 Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 1179.
156 Ibid., p. 1181.
157 CA, Art. 276 para. 3. The shareholders’ meeting may even revisit the financial report. CA, 
Art. 300 (e) para. 3.
158 CA, Art. 252 para. 4. This, however, does not preclude directors’ liability for unlawful 
dividend distribution if the shareholders decision was grounded on inaccurate, incomplete and 
incorrect financial statements and reports.
159 Arg ex CA, Art. 252 para. 5. Barbić, op. cit. (n. 24), p. 815.
160 Contrary ibid., p. 822.
161 See supra section 2.3.3.
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Croatia could follow suit and introduce a simple plc (‘jednostavno dioničko 
društvo’) having no or only 1 HRK minimum share capital. As such a move 
would downplay the ‘guarantee’ role of the share capital, there would be a need 
for introducing a novel, solvency-based test as the only mechanism of creditor 
protection. Under such a distribution regime, the company’s directors would 
not be bound to check the balance-sheet solvency but rather the trading sol-
vency. Alternatively, the balance sheet could still serve as a starting reference 
point in the due process of dividend distribution but could be, for example, 
overridden in favor of the solvency assessment as the final yardstick for decid-
ing on the distributable profit. However, interfering with the minimum capital 
requirement does not mean that the entire concept of share capital should be 
abolished. As share capital serves means other than a mere profit distribution 
(e.g. as a yardstick for determination of shareholders’ voting rights), it should 
be kept while leaving to the shareholders to determine its amount on company 
formation162 and capital increase, respectively.
3.2. PRIVATE LIMITED COMPANIES
3.2.1. STATE OF THE ART
As EU company law does not harmonize issues related to private limited com-
panies,163 EU Member States have sole discretion to choose the applicable dis-
tribution regime for private limited companies.164 Unlike Germany, Croatia 
decided not to broaden the substantive scope of the Second Company Law 
Directive to private limited companies. Instead, the dividend distribution rules 
in private limited companies refer solely to the simple earned surplus (net prof-
it) test.165 Such a test, however, must mutatis mutandis consider the ‘circum-
stances’ test, as otherwise, the shareholders’ decision to withhold distribution 
of dividend could be void.166 It follows that under Croatian company law a 
dividend in private companies may be lawfully and validly paid following the 
application of the cumulative ‘earned surplus’ and ‘circumstances’ test unless 
the shareholders’ meeting has decided otherwise on the grounds of law or ar-
ticles of associations.167 
162 Jakšić; Petrović, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 1115.
163 Jovanovič, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 537.
164 Ibid., p. 542.
165 CA, Art. 406, para. 1. In favour of such interpretation of EU solutions on private compa-
nies also Rickford, op. cit. (n. 5), p. 991.
166 Arg. ex CA, Art. 449 in conjunction with Art. 365 para. 1 CA.
167 CA, Art. 406 in conjunction with arts. 449 and 365 para. 1 CA.
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3.2.2. PROSPECTS
De lege ferenda Croatia could use the EU harmonization gap so as to intro-
duce a novel private limited company lacking any minimum capital require-
ment, and a solvency-based test for the purpose of the determination of the 
distributable amount.168 Such a test could supplement the current operating net 
profit test, or replace it completely, as no ‘top-down’ EU rules exist in this field 
of law. Along the same lines of reasoning as with regard to the public limited 
companies, share capital should be kept while leaving to the shareholders to 
determine its amount on company formation169 and capital increase, respec-
tively.
4. CONCLUSION
For over a century the continental legal doctrine has considered share capi-
tal as an important guarantee for securing creditors’ rights, and a barrier to 
shareholders’ and directors’ reckless behavior. However, the perspective has 
changed at the outset of the twenty-first century, mostly as a result of the influx 
of the Anglo-American liberal doctrine. From that moment on the traditional 
rules on the share, capital maintenance has been criticized for providing an 
inaccurate picture of the company’s net asset structure. As share capital lacks 
any guarantee function, insisting on minimum capital contributions on the 
company’s formation has been regarded as a disproportionate and deterring 
incorporation requirement. Furthermore, the share capital concept relies on 
the numbers (‘balance sheet solvency’) rather than on the company’s actual 
commercial position (‘trading solvency’), allowing the critics to object that the 
concept is too mechanic and, hence, detached from the company’s economic 
context. 
Many have urged for revisiting the EU legal capital regime, which follows the 
traditional legal capital doctrine. On the one hand, there have been sugges-
tions that the existing system should be completely abandoned in favor of the 
solvency test. On the other hand, most authors urge for less radical solutions, 
viz. leaving the legal capital concept while complementing it with contractual, 
property, and company law tools. At a practical level, contractual and property 
mechanisms such as bank covenants, guarantees, pledges, and floating charges 
are often contracted for by major, voluntary creditors, and serve to protect their 
claims ex ante. At the company law level, hard law mechanisms such as man-
168 Jakšić; Petrović, op. cit. (n. 5),  p. 1115.
169 Ibid.
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datory transparency and disclosure rules are usually complemented by volun-
tary soft law measures such as recommendations and corporate governance 
codes. Along with their preventive role, company law tools may also serve 
as ex post remedies seeking the return of the unlawfully disposed company 
equity from the shareholders, compensation for damages from the corporate 
directors, or asking the opportunistic shareholders to take liability for credi-
tors’ claims in case of company’s insolvency. Those remedies are particularly 
apt for the protection of non-voluntary creditors, who had been deprived of the 
possibility to contract for legal protection. 
However, private law mechanisms demonstrate certain weaknesses. They are 
either reserved for major creditors, voluntary in their application, or difficult to 
enforce. Therefore, in pursuit of an efficient mean of creditor protection, one 
has to turn to a commercially oriented distribution yardstick that can force 
directors to assess ex ante the potential outcomes of the distribution in light 
of the actual economic surroundings of the company, be more inclusive, and 
render the directors liable where there was no reasonable economic case for 
dividend distribution. Such an approach requires introducing solvency-based 
standards into the existing EU distribution regime. Unfortunately, not much 
has been done so far at the EU level to revise the current mandatory legal cap-
ital regime either in terms of replacing it or complementing it with a solvency 
test. Early attempts to introduce a novel EU private company form, having a 
symbolic amount of legal capital and the solvency test as a yardstick for div-
idend distribution, have failed due to conceptual dissents at the highest EU 
institutional levels.
Nonetheless, the normative restraints coming from the mandatory character of 
the EU capital maintenance regime are not as precluding as it might seem at 
first glance. The Codification provides only minimum safeguards for creditor 
protection and does so only for a numerus clausus of public limited compa-
nies. Such a scope of the substantive application allows, on the one hand, the 
coexistence of the prescriptive capital safeguards and civil law arrangements 
in basic public limited companies. Those civil arrangements act, hence, as 
complementary tools for potentially endangered creditors’ claims in case of 
otherwise lawful capital returns. On the other hand, such a scope of applica-
tion does not preclude the EU Member States to introduce the novel, alterna-
tive corporate forms of public companies (‘simple PLCs’). Novel corporate 
forms, being outside the harmonized area of EU company law, would not be 
subject to traditional legal capital rules. Such corporate forms may relate their 
distribution regimes to any economically sound scheme, including but not lim-
ited to solvency tests. Likewise, EU Member States have sole discretion to 
introduce their own distribution schemes for private limited companies, as this 
area of company law falls within the ambits of national company laws.
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Cases of France, the Netherlands, and Poland demonstrate the willingness of 
continental jurisdictions to dilute the traditional legal capital concept, includ-
ing the distribution restraints arising from the balance sheet test. Along these 
lines, Croatian legislator could introduce trading solvency test into the CA 
as an additional, third-level yardstick for prudent dividend distribution in the 
traditional public limited company (‘d.d.’) and an exclusive or additional yard-
stick for dividend distribution in some novel corporate form (e.g. ‘simple d.d.’). 
Asking the corporate directors to take regard of the company’s solvency pros-
pects would be for the benefit of voluntary and involuntary creditors, as both 
categories would be equally secured against rash decisions on dividend dis-
tribution. Furthermore, tying the company’s remuneration policy to the long-
term outcomes of the prudent dividend distribution policy would significantly 
stimulate directors’ forward-looking approach, and, hence, contribute to the 
idea of the sustainable company (‘going-concern’ approach). 
Speaking of its design, the solvency test should regard various socio-econom-
ic circumstances indicating the company’s solvency prospects, where balance 
sheet solvency and earned surplus would/could serve only as a starting point 
of reference. The final decision on the distribution would depend on the over-
all economic and social assessment of the company’s position instead of bare 
financial numbers. Such a test should, however, not be accompanied by the sol-
vency statement, as such a solution would interfere with the existing Croatian 
regime of the division of competences within a company. Mutatis mutandis, 
solvency test could be applied to other forms of distributions that have so far 
relied on the two-fold balance sheet test. Given that the private limited com-
pany regime has already turned to the net profit test, there are no obstacles for 
turning to the solvency assessment as a complementary or exclusive means 
of dividend distribution in (simple) private limited companies. However, in-
troducing a solvency test should not make the legal capital doctrine complete 
obsolete. As legal capital rules serve purposes other than mere capital dis-
tribution, they should be kept at some minimum level, and aligned with the 
modernized distribution rules. 
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